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Abstract: A flexible approach to direct inflation targeting is a viable monetary policy 
choice for transition economies that is believed to facilitate both the economic transition 
and the monetary convergence to the euro.  Following this assumption, an analytical 
model investigating the link between the inflation process and monetary variables in 
transition economies is advanced in this study. The empirical testing is conducted for 
Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary.  The analysis recommends that the monetary 
convergence begins with inflation targeting and concludes with a full-fledged 
euroization. It further advocates the application of flexible benchmarks of monetary 
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I. Introduction 
 
During the first decade of economic transition, monetary policies in Central European 
countries relied on fixed exchange rates for building monetary stability and credibility.  
Commitment to stable exchange rates, along with prudent fiscal policies, helped these 
countries lower inflation to single digit levels.  But in order to bring it down further to the 
levels comparable with those in the European Union, monetary authorities in these 
countries face a challenge of designing appropriate policy strategies and tactics.  Fixed 
exchange rates were intrinsically built into the program of comprehensive economic 
reform and were the only feasible option at the beginning of transition.  They served as a 
crucial policy anchor for launching the process of disinflation.  As the transition has 
advanced, the transition countries have abandoned currency pegs. Their exit strategies 
have been made possible by the ongoing institutional development of financial markets 
and banking systems that enabled the application of indirect instruments of monetary 
policy.  Consequently, central banks in transition economies of Central Europe have 
begun searching for appropriate autonomous monetary policies that could underpin their 
commitment to pursuing price stability. 
  The underlying assumption of my analysis is that the Central European transition 
countries who are now the candidates for the EU accession will be well advised to 
strengthen the monetary policy framework of direct inflation targeting (DIT) at their 
present stage of transition.  A flexible approach to DIT will likely facilitate a successful 
monetary convergence to the EU of the candidate countries.  I refrain from engaging in 
the ongoing discussion on the viability and feasibility of a ‘leap to euroization’ (in the 
sense of an early unilateral adoption of the euro as a legal tender).  The debate on this 
subject has been extensive and inspiring (Begg, et.al, 2001; Bratkowski and Rostowski, 
2001).  In my opinion, euroization is an ultimate and beneficial policy option for these 
countries.  However, before its possible adoption, the EU candidates need to establish 
‘foundational credibility’ through autonomous monetary policy resulting in a sustained 
period of price stability (Orlowski, 2000 and 2001).  
  While advocating an autonomous monetary policy based on DIT, I propose an 
analytical model examining the link between the inflation process in transition economies 
and a set of monetary variables.  The model is empirically tested for Poland, the Czech 
Republic and Hungary - all of them have officially enacted various forms of DIT.  The 
empirical analysis provides useful information about the monetary policy transmission 
channels. It is aimed at identifying effective tools of disinflation in these economies.  The 
empirical findings provide guidance for improving the existing inflation targeting 
systems.  The focal point of my investigation is the assessment of whether monetary 
policies in these countries are backward or forward-looking, and the evaluation of the 
exchange rate, the aggregate demand and the rational expectations channels of monetary 
policy transmission.  The analysis centers further on feasibility of a flexible, rather than a 
strict approach to inflation targeting.  Flexible inflation targeting not only preserves 
commitment to disinflation, but also allows for controlling other policy objectives, such 
as income growth or exchange rate stability.  The latter is particularly important for 
achieving a successful monetary convergence to the euro. 
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  The study begins from an overview of the current monetary policy regimes in 
Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, by presenting the foundations of their present 
DIT in Section II.  The institutional framework of these policies is useful for designing 
the model reflecting the link between inflation and monetary policy variables in   
transition economies, which is presented in Section III.  The empirical tests of the model 
are analyzed in Section IV, and the concluding Section V summarizes key findings and 
presents several recommendations for advancing autonomous monetary policies in these 
relatively advanced transition economies. 
 
II.  Inflation Targeting Regimes of the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary 
 
Stabilization programs in Central European transition economies that were initiated in the 
early 1990s played a pivotal role in bringing inflation down to single digit levels over the 
course of several years.  This was accomplished by a set of measures including currency 
pegs, followed later by implicit target zones for exchange rates.  Such policies served as 
nominal anchors for macroeconomic discipline.  Other policy measures that assisted the 
process of disinflation included privatization and de-monopolization of state companies, 
trade liberalization, deregulation of financial systems and tight fiscal policies.  As the 
transition advanced, Central European countries have decided to depart from exchange 
rate targeting and seek alternative measures that would provide sufficient policy 
discipline allowing further reduction in inflation to more sustainable levels.  Currency 
pegs brought about problems of real appreciation of domestic currencies and the 
subsequent troubles with current account deficits and capital inflows that precipitated 
inflation.  In response, governments of Central European countries have decided to depart 
from exchange rate targeting and to look for a more credible nominal anchor for 
monetary policy.  They did so at different times and with dissimilar determination.   
Poland abandoned a rigid peg of the zloty (PLN) to the dollar already in May 
1991, although it maintained implicit target zones for the exchange rate accompanied by 
crawling devaluation until April 2000.  During the period 1996-1998, the National Bank 
of Poland (NBP) experimented with targeting interest rate (1996), monetary base (1997) 
and M2 money growth (1998).  None of these alternative regimes were suitable for a 
country in transition that experienced deep structural changes, strong relative price 
adjustments and a fast growing monetization (as reflected by the growth of M2-to-GDP 
ratio from 15 percent in 1991 to 45 percent in 2000).  Under such circumstances, the 
actual money growth exceeded significantly any reasonable targets that were set at levels 
comparable to those in Western economies.  Interest rate targeting has proven to be 
erroneous as well, because Poland and other small open transition economies are subject 
to sizeable changes in capital inflows that induce large, temporary shocks to interest 
rates.  This vulnerability to external capital shocks was particularly evident at the time of 
the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 that brought about strong contagion effects to 
their financial markets (Linne, 1999; Gelos and Sahay, 2000).  In search for an explicit 
nominal anchor for monetary policy, the NBP decided to adopt a system of DIT as of 
January 1999. 
 
The Czech National Bank (CNB) introduced a similar policy framework a year 
earlier.  It did so in response to a struggle with the rigid currency peg that was maintained   4
until 1997, and that brought about significant real appreciation of the Czech Koruna 
(CKR) and a deep current account deficit (Brada and Kutan, 1999).  These 
macroeconomic imbalances, along with the institutional deficiencies in the financial 
sector precipitated a deep crisis of the Czech financial system in the summer of 1997 
(Linne, 1999).  A monetary policy framework of DIT was a viable and prudent response 
to the vacuum in the policy discipline created by abandoning the currency peg. 
Pursuing a distinctly different approach to monetary policy, the National Bank of 
Hungary (NBH) maintained a crawling peg system of the Hungarian Forint (HUF) to the 
Euro (EUR) accompanied by a narrow tolerance band of 2.25 percent on either side of the 
parity until May 2001.  In spite of the prolonged currency peg, Hungary was able to 
mitigate real appreciation of the HUF, thus to alleviate large balance of payments 
disequilibria thanks to maintaining wage discipline, productivity gains and large inflows 
of foreign direct investments.  Recently however, the NBH faced increasing problems 
with manageability of large short-term capital inflows and with inflation levels 
stubbornly exceeding those of Poland and the Czech Republic.  Needless to say, crawling 
devaluation has exacerbated inflationary pressures on the Hungarian economy.   
Responding to these mounting problems, the NBH has decided to launch a DIT system as 
of June 2001.   
As of mid-2001, monetary authorities of all three countries officially follow 
policies of DIT.  In my opinion, these policies are particularly useful and viable at the 
present stage of economic transition and also at the time of a global economic slowdown 
coupled with increasing political and financial risk.  In the presence of slower economic 
growth, fiscal discipline is seriously jeopardized by lower than expected budget revenues 
and by political reluctance to cut government expenditures.  This aggravates the risk of a 
lax fiscal discipline as the growing budget deficits are already projected to exceed 5 
percent of GDP in all three countries in 2000 and 2001 fiscal years.  Consequently, 
monetary policy will have to assume a stronger responsibility for pursuing disinflation, 
thereby also for facilitating monetary convergence to the euro.  Policies based on a 
currency peg would require a high degree of fiscal tightness since they would eradicate 
monetary autonomy, which is simply not feasible at the present time.  For this reason, a 
premature return to a euro-peg would indubitably fail to facilitate reaching the goals of 
monetary convergence to the EU/EMU.  Without doubt, autonomous monetary policies 
based on DIT seem to provide a sufficient framework for achieving ambitious goals of 
disinflation.   
Thus the countries in transition will be well advised to resist recent calls for 
income targeting monetary policies that are becoming popular in the United States, Japan, 
or even in the European Union.  Income targeting is consistent with monetary easing that 
is unsuitable for countries that are struggling with fiscal discipline. Similar strategies 
applied by the economies in transition could hinder monetary discipline, reinvent the 
spiral of nominal indexation, and jeopardize disinflation.  Income targeting might be 
viable for averting recession in highly developed industrial countries, but it would be too 
costly for transition countries and, in principle, for other emerging market economies. 
The approaches to inflation targeting and the degree of its advancement are not 
uniform among the three examined countries.  Specific features of these policies are 
presented in Table 1.  
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Table 1: Inflation Targeting Regimes: the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary 
  Czech Republic  Poland  Hungary 
Type of DIT regime  Headline CPI inflation 
targeting (with net inflation 
as a supporting target); 
relatively strict net inflation 
targeting prior to 2001 
CPI inflation targeting, 
strict 
CPI and core inflation 
targeting, flexible (implicit) 
with some attention to 
exchange rate stability 
Corresponding exchange 
rate regime 
Managed float  Float  Implicit target zone of +/- 15% 
against EUR, 0.2% monthly 
rate of crawling devaluation 




2.0 % net inflation with a 
+/- 1% tolerance band for 
the end of 2005, prior to 
EMU accession in Jan. 
2006 
CPI inflation of 4.0% 
for the end of 2003 
CPI inflation of 2.0% reached 
by March 2004, prior to the 
targeted EMU accession in 
Jan.2006 
Recent operating targets: 
a. December 2001 
b. December 2002 
a.  2.0-4.0% net and 4.3-
5.8% CPI inflation 
b. dynamic  range 
descending evenly from 
3.0-5.0% CPI and 2.0-
4.0% net inflation in 
Jan.2001 to the long-
term target 
a.  6.0-8.0 % CPI 
inflation 
b. 4.0-6.0%  CPI 
inflation 
a.  6.0-8.0 % CPI inflation 
 
b.  3.5-5.5% CPI inflation 
Recent CPI y-o-y 
inflation (August 2001) 
               5.5%  5.1%                 8.7% 
Inflation Risk Premium* 
a. Jan. 1998-Dec. 1999 
b. Jan. 2000-June 2001 
 
a.   4.73% 









Inflation forecasts, monthly 
revised, incorporate a 
survey of inflation 
expectations of ten banks 
Inflation forecasts, 
unspecified time, active 
use of policy bias for 
two quarters ahead 
Rolling inflation forecasts for 6 
quarters ahead, revised monthly  
Inflation reports  Quarterly, annual  Quarterly, annual  Quarterly (as of Aug. 2001), 
annual 
Target announcements  CNB Board in 
consultations with MF 
NBP Monetary Policy 
Council 
NBH Council, transparent 
methodology 
 
Notes: * Inflation Risk Premium is computed as a difference between average monthly 
interest rates on three-months Treasury bills and the average CPI year-on-year inflation 
rates.  
 
Source: The author’s own compilation, based on CNB, NBP, and NBH data and reports. 
 
  A pioneer among inflation targeting banks in Central Europe, the CNB introduced 
net inflation targeting in January 1998, as a follow up to abandoning the fixed exchange 
rate in May 1997.  During the period 1998-2000, CNB targeted net inflation that was 
based on changes in the index of retail prices but excluded administratively regulated 
prices and fees.  The CNB intention was to distance itself from shocks in CPI inflation 
induced by sharp increases in governmentally regulated prices and fees that were   6
routinely conducted at the beginning of each year until January 1998.  Specifically, the 
annual increases in administrative prices reached 22.7 percent in 1997, 20.4 percent in 
1998 and only 4.2 percent in 1999.  The recent smaller increases in regulated prices 
certainly have helped shift the CNB policy focus from net inflation to CPI-based inflation 
targeting.  The operating targets for December 2001 and December 2002 are based on 
CPI rather than net inflation levels, as shown in Table 1.   
  The long-term inflation target has been set by the CNB at 2.0 percent net inflation 
with the tolerance band of one percent on either side of the midpoint level for the end of 
2005.  Adherence to the long-term target and the dynamic trajectory of disinflation that is 
fully consistent with this target is a dominant measure of efficiency of the Czech DIT 
system.  The achievement of interim targets is monitored on a monthly basis in terms of 
deviations of actual inflation from the target trend.  This is a prudent approach that 
increases transparency and discloses a long reaching path of operating targets.  It also 
underpins the CNB commitment to reaching the predetermined inflation targets.  Because 
of its higher transparency and predictability, the dynamic trajectory approach is superior 
to the end-of-year specification of operating targets that does not convey adequate 
information about long-term inflation forecasts. It is because possible revisions of year-
end targets downplay the importance of the long-term goal and question feasibility of 
pursuing the trajectory leading to this goal.  Such revisions might also cast doubt on 
commitment of central banks to reach the long-term goal.  Therefore, recent decisions of 
the CNB to emphasize the long-term goal and the dynamic inflation trajectory make the 
Czech DIT system highly transparent and purposeful.  Furthermore, the dynamic 
approach alleviates unnecessary and unproductive struggle with fiscal authorities about 
operating inflation targets.  In a common policy practice, governments willing to run 
larger budget deficits often exert pressures on central banks to raise short-term inflation 
goals.  Such pressures become irrelevant if a central bank’s policy is bound by adherence 
to the dynamic trajectory of disinflation.
1  Undoubtedly, the dynamic trajectory approach 
enacted by the CNB gives it more leverage in the disputes about the necessity to maintain 
monetary policy discipline. For this reason, the Czech DIT system is clearly superior to 
the Polish regime, which emphasizes adherence to year-end targets that in turn instigates 
routine criticism of the central bank for its excessively restrictive policy and overly 
ambitious inflation targets.   
  The CNB has developed a fairly advanced system of inflation forecasting in spite 
of a number of technical deficiencies that are prevalent at the present stage of economic 
transition.  These obstacles include high instability of monetary variables in the small, 
open economies that are susceptible to contagion effects of external financial crises.   
They also include short time series of data, the time consistency of which is further 
distorted by frequent systemic changes in monetary regimes.  The CNB has been able to 
alleviate these deficiencies at least partially by conducting surveys of inflation forecasts 
of ten leading institutions in the Czech financial system.  By doing so, it is able to detect 
inflation expectations of the financial sector and relate them to the official inflation 
forecast in order to devise appropriate policy responses.   
  The Czech DIT regime began from a relatively strict version of inflation 
targeting. The tolerance band during the first two years was set at 0.5 percent around the 
                                                 
1 The advantages of targeting a trend-consistent inflation trajectory over the emphasis on year-end 
operating targets are convincingly explained by King (1996).   7
midpoint targets (the year-end net inflation targets were 5.5-6.5 percent in 1998, and 4.0-
5.0 percent in 1999).  As the system evolved and inflation become considerably lower, 
the bands of operating targets were increased to one percent in 2000 and 2001.   
Consistently, the year-end target setting was replaced by a dynamic inflation trajectory.  
These modifications certainly improved transparency of the DIT regime and made 
monetary policy more predictable for financial institutions.  The ongoing development of 
the Czech DIT system has enabled the CNB to relax restrictiveness of monetary policy 
and improve credibility, as implied by declining inflation risk premiums in Table 1.   
  A similar advancement of the DIT system is not apparent in Poland.  The NBP 
launched inflation targeting in January 1999.  Initially, it applied a strict version of CPI-
based targeting with a narrow tolerance band of 6.6-7.8 percent for the end of 1999, and 
5.4-6.8 percent for the end of 2000.  The target band has been eventually increased and 
broadened to 6.0-8.0 percent for 2001, since the target was missed during the first two 
years of the new policy regime.  Consistently, Poland’s financial authorities applied a 
floating exchange rate system as of April 2000, replacing the previous broad target zone 
of exchange rate of plus-minus 15 percent.  In spite of its failure to reach the 1999 and 
2000 operating targets, the NBP has demonstrated a strong determination to pursue the 
long-term CPI inflation goal that has been set at 4.0 percent for the end of 2003.  It has 
done so by maintaining interest rates at very high levels, as reflected by high inflation 
risk premiums shown in Table 1.  Such a restrictive monetary policy has resulted in the 
lowest level of actual inflation among the three examined countries (Table1). The CPI 
inflation is likely to fall well below the operating target set for December 2001. 
  The Polish DIT system has yet to prove visible gains in monetary credibility. The 
decreasing trend of CPI inflation has been accomplished by very restrictive monetary 
policy, as proven by high inflation risk premiums reported in Table 1.  A slow progress of 
the Polish DIT system may be at least partially attributed to the vagueness of the official 
pronouncement of its strategies, objectives and guiding rules.  While the Polish system 
overemphasizes the importance of accomplishing year-end operating target, its 
determination is not fully supported by the disclosure of official inflation forecasts.   
Although the NBP Monetary Policy Council frequently refers to the future ‘policy bias’ 
in its official announcements and reports, the actual policy changes seem to rely heavily 
on backward-looking, rather than forward-looking expectations (Orlowski, 2001). 
  Hungary is the newest member of the ‘inflation targeting club’ in Central Europe.  
The NBH has officially begun pursuing DIT in June 2001, after realizing that the 
previous strict exchange rate targeting system did not help accomplish goals of price 
stability.  At the time of the new policy announcement in May 2001, Hungary’s CPI 
annualized inflation was running at 10.8 percent, well above the levels in the Czech 
Republic and in Poland.  The NBH has set a long-term target at 2.0 percent to be reached 
by March 2004, or two years prior to the anticipated entry to the eurozone in 2006.  
Consistently, the operating target has been set for the next two years at the levels reported 
in Table 1.  Accomplishing these targets will be a challenge; it will require a better 
coordination of fiscal and monetary policies than the one prevailing in Hungary for the 
past several years.  The previous monetary system was based on the HUF peg to the euro 
with a narrow band of 2.25 percent on either side of parity and accompanied by crawling 
devaluation (recently at 0.2 percent monthly rate).  The currency peg was not very 
successful in lowering inflation to sustained single digit levels, because it failed to   8
provide sufficient policy discipline that would facilitate a successful monetary 
convergence to the euro.  Monetary policy in Hungary will have to be more restrictive 
than that implied by low inflation risk premiums shown in Table 1.  However, the degree 
of restrictiveness can be relaxed if the government is able to demonstrate stronger 
commitment to fiscal discipline.   
  Although it is too early to detect any meaningful results of the new policy, the 
Hungarian DIT system seems to be well drafted and exhaustively explained.  Its rules are 
transparent, reinforced by a comprehensive articulation of the forward-looking 
mechanism that relies on monthly revised rolling inflation forecasts for six quarters 
ahead. 
  In sum, it is not a coincidence that the monetary authorities in the three advanced 
Central European transition countries have chosen to apply DIT regimes at the present 
stage of transition and monetary convergence to the euro.  They need to demonstrate 
clear commitment to disinflation, particularly at the present time of high fiscal policy 
uncertainty.  They need to prove ability to reach price stability by applying modern, 
forward-looking monetary regimes.  Similar complex policies could not had been enacted 
in these countries at earlier stages of economic transition in the absence of the necessary 
institutional framework (developed financial markets) and analytical tools (methods of 
inflation forecasting) to support such policies.  Nevertheless, the technical advancement 
of these countries’ DIT regimes is far from being perfect. There is a room for improving 
techniques of forecasting inflation and modeling monetary policies.  Following this 
belief, I attempt to design an analytical model prescribing the inflation process in the 
economies in transition.  Its empirical tests might be useful for designing appropriate 
venues of monetary convergence to the euro.   
 
III.  A Dynamic Inflation Process in Transition Economies 
 
Recognizing the experience of Central European monetary authorities with gradual 
departure from fixed exchange rate regimes, I advocate the relevance of DIT at the 
present stage of transition.  This type of monetary policy allows focusing on disinflation 
as a primary goal of monetary policy, which makes it a viable starting point of monetary 
convergence to the euro.  The policy long-term target, which is consistent with a 
predetermined trajectory of disinflation, will help facilitate transition to a stable currency 
regime.  Therefore, I propose a dynamic policy sequence that begins with a strict form of 
DIT, followed by a more flexible approach that is based on combination of well-specified 
inflation targets and supporting targets for the (floating) exchange rate.  At its final stage, 
the monetary convergence will conclude with a full-fledged euroization, not necessarily 
preceded by a peg to the euro.  The convergence process may take several years and one 
may argue that the proposed sequence entails too many and too costly changes in 
monetary regimes.  However, I believe that the process is based essentially on two 
regimes: inflation targeting, and full euroization.  The latter may be accomplished 
through a one-time, radical change, or a ‘leap to the eurosystem’, when the candidate   9
countries reach a satisfactory level of price stability comparable with that in the 
eurozone
2.   
  In search for optimal policy for the transition economies that are targeting 
inflation, I make several assumptions that are derived from the prominent analysts of DIT 
regimes, particularly Svensson (1999, 2000 and 2001), Eichengreen (2001) and, 
specifically for transition countries, Siklos and Abel (2001). These assumptions are 
essential for designing an analytical model that represents the inflation process in 
transition economies. 
 
1.  I advocate a forward-looking character of DIT regimes in transition economies.  
Accordingly, central banks will be well advised to adjust policy instruments in 
response to changes in inflation forecasts.  A forward-looking approach provides 
a comfort of keeping interest rates at considerably lower levels than those 
prevailing under backward-looking policies.  While responding to inflation 
forecasts, central banks may use a future policy (tightening) bias that will help 
them refrain from applying exorbitantly high interest rates. 
2.  DIT systems ought to be transparent.  Policy goals, strategies and tactics need to 
be thoroughly explained to the public at large and, in some instances, fully 
consulted with qualified institutions and specialists.  Full communication of 
policy rules and actions, particularly in the environment of transition economies, 
becomes indispensable for breaking a cycle of inflation inertia that stems from 
nominal, backward-looking indexation of wages and prices. 
3.  Central banks need to have good knowledge about the prevailing channels of 
monetary policy transmission.  There is a common belief that the exchange rate 
channel is predominant in transition economies, particularly in Hungary (Golinelli 
and Rovelli, 2001), although in Orlowski (1999) I suggest to downplay its 
dominance in the cases of Poland and the Czech Republic.  However, in order to 
further disinflation, central banks may want to find methods leading to a more 
active role of the rational expectations channel.  This can be accomplished 
through more transparent and forward-looking policy rules and actions. 
4.  Perhaps most importantly, central banks must be free of government dominance 
and of constraints imposed on them by lax fiscal policies.  DIT is successfully 
implemented when fiscal discipline is maintained and when the entire government 
shares responsibility for pursuing goals of price stability. 
 
Taking these assumptions into consideration, I devise a model aimed at explaining the 
inflation process applicable to specific conditions of countries in transition.  It begins 
from a simple, open economy Phillips curve in the form proposed by Svensson (2000): 
 




                                                 
2 There is an exhaustive literature supporting the bi-polar view of exchange rate regimes and proving that 
interim solutions, such as implicit target zones for exchange rate, are too costly (see for instance, Masson, 








t y  being a log of aggregate demand and 
n
t y  the natural level of output that is 
assumed to be exogenous. 
  The log of real exchange rate  t e  is the sum of the log of nominal rate  t s  and the 
inflation differential of the log of domestic price 
d
t p  and the foreign price level 
f





t t t p p s e − + ≡                        ( 3 )  
 
In this form, the nominal exchange rate  t s  is expressed as a foreign currency value of a 
unit of domestic currency, thus an increase in  t s  means nominal appreciation and an 
increase in  t e  real appreciation of domestic currency. 
  The open economy inflation process can be extended by the introduction of 
forward-looking expectations: 
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This is an open-economy Phillips curve with forward-looking expectations. The function 
reacts to the lagged effect of real exchange rate movement  ) ( 1 − − t t e e , as well as to the 
direction of the real exchange rate forecast for τ -periods ahead, formulated at time t, 
which is  ) ( / t t t e e − +τ .  The inflation response to the real exchange rate forecast is assumed 
to be strongly affected by interest rate differentials and by shocks to capital inflows.  The 
role of the exchange rate channel of monetary policy transmission is reflected by  1 e α  and 
it is more pronounced if the coefficient has a higher absolute value.  The shift parameter 
π α  varies between 0 and 1 and it reflects the relative importance of backward (when it is 
close to 1) or forward (close to 0) looking expectations.  The forward expectations are 
geared to the inflation forecast  t t / τ π +  for τ -periods ahead, formulated at the present time 
t.  The shift parameter  π α  is assumed to be diminishing as the policy becomes more 
credible and, at the same time, more responsive to forward-looking expectations.   
The expected variation in the real exchange rate  ) ( / t t t e e − +τ  is assumed to be 












t r is the domestic and 
f
t r is the corresponding foreign short-term interest rate.  The 
interest rate differential is augmented with 
M
t r , which is the interest rate risk reflecting 
the credibility gap between domestic and foreign monetary systems, and with  t υ , which 
represents the asset price shock (the Calvo-type shock, as prescribed by Eichengreen, 
2001).   
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By assumption, the interest rate risk premium fully corresponds to the currency 
risk premium  t θ  in these small open economies whose monetary policies closely follow 




t r θ − =                          (6) 
 
The currency risk premium can be introduced in (5) and the augmented 
international Fischer effect will assume: 
 




t e e r r − − = + − − +τ λ υ θ λ                          (7) 
 
In this relationship, λ  is introduced as the policy bias parameter.  High λ  implies 
reliance on interest rate adjustments in response to changes in foreign rates, as a key tool 
of policy operations.  Adversely, a low value of λ  suggests active management of 
expected real exchange rates, as a predominant policy devise. Moreover, high λ  is 
consistent with a floating exchange rate system within which the nominal exchange rate 
closely follows inflation differentials thus causing a steady expected path of real 
exchange rate.  Under such circumstances, changes in the domestic interest rate 
d
t r  
relative to foreign rate 
f
t r  directly respond to changes in  t θ  and under more discretionary 
policy also to  t υ .  If λ  is close to zero, monetary policy strongly relies on the exchange 
rate channel of the policy transmission.  Then, a central bank responds to the observed 
changes in  t θ  with currency devaluation or revaluation.  A medium level λ  indicates 
application of implicit target zones for the exchange rate.   
The currency risk premium  t θ  is exogenous.  It depends on long-term gains in 
macroeconomic stability of the country relative to its foreign partners.  External shocks 
are also exogenous, although they have normally a short-term impact on the economy and 
do not require corrective adjustments in interest rates. 
It can be further noted that  r e α α λ= − = 2 1  within the framework of (4).   
Thereby, the augmented international effect prescribed by (7) inserted into the 
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The actual experience of the economic transition calls for an assumption that the 
parameter  φ α  is slowly diminishing as the currency risk premium improves.  However, it 
remains to be nearly constant in the short-run.  In addition,  t γ  is believed to be rather 
negligible.  Possible shocks to  t γ  can be either permanent or transitory.  If they are 
permanent and large, it may be plausible for a central bank to target monetary conditions 
index (MCI), thus to respond to currency depreciation by raising interest rates (Hunt, 
1999).  If they are transitory, these shocks do not require active policy responses.  It can 
be noted that pass-through effects of currency depreciation are shown in (8) separately,   12
following their treatment in the model advanced by Ball (1999).  In principle, pass-
through effects have a transitory nature since rising import prices normally affect 
inflation only temporary and active policy responses to them with higher interest rates 
would only amplify the volatility of output and inflation (Eichengreen, 2001).  In his 
seminal study, Ball (1999) suggests that the MCI ought to be adjusted not only to 
movements in the CPI-based inflation, but also to fluctuations in inflation that are 
adjusted for the real exchange rate movement. Then, a central bank will target not only 
CPI inflation alone, but also the overall domestic inflation that takes into consideration 
exchange rate and/or income variables
3.  Consequently, the system will follow a flexible 
inflation-targeting framework, such as the one suggested by (8).  Among other 
considerations, a central bank that applies a flexible inflation target needs to monitor the 
values of α  parameters.  They ought to have a finite sum in order to avoid large 
destabilizing effects of monetary policy on income or on exchange rates.   
It can be further assumed that interest rate differentials in a small open economy 
with liberalized capital account are likely to react to shocks to capital inflows, thus  t γ  
may have a non-zero value. 
The inflationary process (8) can rearranged to display the instrument rule: 
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It can be further rearranged into a feedback rule for monetary policy that incorporates 
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In order to make the general process (10) more applicable to monetary regimes that are 
based on inflation targeting, it is necessary to formulate an appropriate feedback (or 
reaction) function of a central bank.  The Reserve Bank of New Zealand, which has 
pioneered DIT, has developed a reaction function that offers useful guidance for inflation 
targeting in small, open economies (Nadal de Simone, 1998): 
 








t t t t t t s s τ τ τ τ π π π δ π π π + + + + − − − − − − = −                        (11) 
 
where  t t / τ π + is the domestic inflation target, or more specifically, the trajectory-consistent 
level of inflation set for τ -periods ahead,  t s  is the nominal exchange rate, and  t t / τ π +  
denotes forecasts of foreign (f) and domestic (d) inflation for τ -periods ahead.  The 
function can be reset for domestic inflation: 
 








t s s π π α π α π π τ τ τ                        (12) 
                                                 
3 A useful analysis of the role of exchange rate stability in the inflation-targeting framework is presented by 
Haldane (1997).   13
 
This model seems to be suitable for transition economies that are becoming increasingly 
dependent on foreign monetary conditions since it emphasizes the impact of external 
shocks to the exchange rate on domestic inflation, as reflected by a stronger role of  s α .  
Under perfectly flexible exchange rates, rising foreign inflation leads to appreciation of 
domestic currency, thereby it has no effect on domestic inflation.  
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where  π α α β / y y = ;  π α α β / e e = ;  π α α β / r r = ; and  π θ θ α α β / = . 
In the dynamic inflation forecast function, the values of β  coefficients provide monetary 
authorities with information about the nature of the inflation process and policy 
transmission channels.  This knowledge is essential for determining appropriate policy 
feedback rules.  Specifically, a low value of  s β  suggests pursuing an independent 
forward-looking inflation targeting, and its value being close to unity implies a non-
autonomous policy that strongly depends on the external inflationary environment.  If the 
remaining  β  coefficients are zero, the process follows strict inflation targeting, while 
their non-zero values, particularly these of  y β and  e β , imply a flexible approach to 
inflation targeting. 
Dynamic changes in β  coefficients can be applied to the environment of 
transition economies.  Specifically, monetary policies in these economies might have 
started from relatively high values of  s β  and   e β  upon inception of pegged exchange 
rates.  With the advancement of economic transition, these two coefficients might have 
played a diminishing role and the projected inflation might have been increasingly 
sensitive to the remaining β  coefficients.  However, these general statements may not 
always reflect the experiences of individual countries, because systemic foundations of 
their monetary policies have changed at different directions, timing and pace. 
 
IV. Empirical  Evidence 
   14
A straightforward application of (14) aimed at assessing monetary policy conditions in 
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic is not plausible for several technical reasons 
that can be summarized as follows: 
 
1.  These countries have not pursued full-fledged forward-looking monetary policies 
yet. Thus the empirical testing of the future expected inflation  t t / τ π +  based on the 
recent available data could not be conclusive.  Therefore, I have chosen the 
current inflation level  t π  as a dependent variable in the tested model.   
2.  Policy makers in these countries have not officially conducted estimations of the 
output gap and the GDP data are certainly reported on the quarterly basis.  For 
these reasons, I have chosen the index of industrial production as a proxy for each 
country’s output and the data have been seasonally adjusted in order to eliminate 
large, transitory shocks. 
3.  The connection between interest rates and inflation has been refocused onto the 
impact of short-term interest rate differentials (three months Treasury bills) as 
well as bank lending rates differentials between individual transition countries and 
Germany.  The differences in bank lending rates are believed to have impact on 
inflation through international flows of bank credit.  If domestic lending rates are 
too high relative to foreign rates, businesses and individuals may borrow large 
amounts of credit from abroad thus accelerating capital inflows.  Moreover, the 
underdeveloped bond markets and the lack of adequate data on long-term 
Treasury bond rates have hindered a proper assessment of risk premiums, which 
are incorporated in domestic nominal interest rates and not extracted separately. 
4.  The empirical analysis is based on monthly data series in the period January 
1995–June 2001.  Although earlier data are available for these countries, their 
inclusion would distort the empirical findings due to serious systemic 
inconsistencies.  Earlier monetary policies were based on currency pegs and were 
implemented with less complex, direct instruments. Prices were less flexible - 
they were subject to vast administrative interference, financial markets were less 
developed and capital flows were constrained.  Thereby conclusions based on the 
past foundations are likely to be invalid for explaining the current environment of 
monetary policies. 
5.  Inflation targets have been specified only very recently, upon the adoption of DIT 
systems and the dynamic target trajectories have not been officially designed 
(with the exception of the Czech Republic).  Therefore, I have estimated 
smoothed series of inflation trajectories with Hodrick-Prescott filters.  
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where nominal exchange rates  t s  reflect domestic currency values of the euro (based on 
DEM/1.95583 before 1999), 
sa
t IP is a seasonally adjusted (with Census X11 additive) 
index of industrial production, superscripts G denote German variables, 
s
t r  are three 
months Treasury bill rates, and 
l
t r  are prevailing bank lending rates. 
The empirical assessment of β  sensitivity coefficients provides useful 
information about the monetary determinants of inflation and about the features of the 
existing monetary system.  The systemic characteristics can be summarized as follows: 
  
1.  If the estimated value of  1 β  is high and the values of  2 β ,  3 β , 4 β  and 5 β  are low, 
the monetary system follows a strict, backward-looking DIT policy. 
2.  High estimated values of  2 β  and low  1 β , 3 β , 4 β  and 5 β  imply a strict, forward-
looking DIT. 
3. Low  1 β ,  2 β  and  4 β , combined with high 3 β and 5 β  suggest a successful policy 
of strict exchange rate targeting. 
4. Medium  levels  of  1 β  and  2 β  accompanied by higher absolute values of  3 β , 4 β  
and 5 β  indicate flexible inflation targeting (certainly, if these levels are consistent 
with deliberately set targets).  A stronger influence of  3 β and 5 β  relative to  4 β  
suggests a dominant role of exchange rate stability rather than income growth 
within a wider band of tolerance around the inflation target.  In addition, the 
advantage of  2 β  over  1 β  implies a stronger role of forward-looking expectations. 
5.  A high value of  5 β  indicates effective functioning of the exchange rate channel of 
monetary policy transmission, while high  2 β  means reliance on the rational 
expectations channel.  By contrast, high value of  7 β  means a stronger role of the 
credit channel.  Simultaneously, a higher value of  6 β  means effective influence of 
short-term interest rate differentials, thus a strong impact of speculative capital 
inflows on inflation. 
 
In the above form (15), the model emphasizes the monetary and income variables that 
can be influenced by monetary authorities, at least to some degree.  In other words, it 
incorporates variables that might be considered in the determination of monetary policy 
goals and appropriate instruments.  There are, however, important determinants of 
inflation that play a crucial role in transition economies, which are not included in the 
model.  Among them are administrative price adjustments, taxes and wage indexation.  
Because of their exogenous relation to monetary policy, or the inability of central banks 
to influence them, these variables have not been included in the tested model.   
Consequently, the deterministic value of the model is lower because of this exclusion.  
Nevertheless, the model is specifically designed to provide guidance for determining 
monetary policy goals, tactics and instruments based on the variables that are more 
directly related to it.  
  Direct estimation of (15) is limited by non-stationarity of almost all variables 
included in the model for all four countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and   16
Germany).  This problem is reflected by the results of the Augmented Dickey Fuller 
(ADF) stationarity test shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2:  ADF Unit Root Test for Stationarity 
 
  τ  τ’ 
Poland: 
CPI inflation (year-on-year) 
PLN value of EUR 
Real Effective Exchange Rate 
3-Months T-bill Rate 
Bank Lending Interest Rate 
Industrial Production (s.a.) 



















CPI inflation (year-on-year) 
Net Inflation (year-on-year) 
CKR value of EUR 
Real Effective Exchange Rate 
3-Months T-bill Rate 
Bank Lending Interest Rate 
Industrial Production (s.a.) 
CPI Inflation Trend (HP Filter) 

























CPI inflation (year-on-year) 
HUF value of EUR 
Real Effective Exchange Rate 
3-Months T-bill Rate 
Bank Lending Interest Rate 
Industrial Production (s.a.) 





















CPI inflation (year-on-year) 
3-Months T-bill Rate 
Bank Lending Interest Rate 














Notes: τ is based on the ADF test for unit root in the level of the variable, including trend 
and intercept, with one lagged difference and τ’is for the first difference of the variable, 
including trend and intercept, with one lagged difference.  These τ indicators are 
certainly different from the τ  time horizon operators in the model used for forecast 
variables.  McKinnon critical τ-values are: –4.0803 at one percent, -3.4681 at five 
percent, and –3.1606 at ten percent probability. The τ-value of the Czech net inflation in 
the second difference of the variable is –7.4156.  Trend inflation variables are based on 
Hodrick Prescott filter estimation. They are reported only for the purpose of completing   17
the list of all variables included in estimation of (15). Industrial production indexes are 
seasonally adjusted with Census X11 Additive. 
 
Source: Own calculations based on data from the International Monetary Fund, the 
Czech National Bank, the Czech Statistical Office, the National Bank of Poland, the 
National Bank of Hungary, and PlanEcon (real effective exchange rates). 
 
  As evidenced in Table 2, all examined variables (with the exception of the Polish 
real exchange rate) are non-stationary at their levels.  All of them become stationary in 
the series representing their first differences.  Therefore, the empirical estimation of (15) 
is based on the function representing first differences of all dependent and independent 
variables.  The results of these regressions are shown in Table 3. 
 
 
Table 3:  Estimation Representations of (15) 
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Notes:  β ˆ are estimated values of the corresponding β  coefficients in (15). Standard 
errors are reported in upper and t-statistics in lower parentheses. The time horizon τ  is 
two quarters (six months) ahead, thus  t t / τ π +  is regressed as a 6 months ahead forecast of 
inflation, based on the trend estimated with the Hodrick Prescott filter. 
 
Source: Own calculations based on data as in Table 2. 
 
The empirical testing of (15) shows that the factors that determine the inflation 
process vary quite significantly for all three economies.  The examined series do not 
suffer from mean reversion (or ‘random walk’) since the estimated values of  0 β  are all 
close to zero and the Durbin Watson statistics are within the tolerance range (around 2).  
The absence of mean reversion means that the last realization of the change in π  is a 
good forecast for its next realization.  
The model is fairly explanatory in the cases of the Czech net inflation and 
Hungarian and Polish CPI inflation, but less for the Czech CPI inflation.  These findings 
support the statement that the Czech CPI inflation was strongly influenced in the 
investigated period of time by the factors unrelated to monetary policy, such as 
adjustments in administrative prices, VAT rates and import duties (Brada and Kutan, 
1999).  Within this context, the recent switch by the CNB into CPI inflation targeting 
may be correct as long as the Czech Government will refrain from large increases in 
regulated prices that were last conducted in 1998.  Moreover, the investigated function 
does not take into consideration significant changes in relative prices induced by Balassa-
Samuelson effects (BSE).  The BSE phenomenon is based on the notion that a faster 
productivity growth in the traded goods sector tends to drive up wages in all sectors, thus 
relative prices of non-traded goods to those of the traded goods will rise.  BSE is 
pronounced in catching-up economies, since their productivity growth is normally faster 
than that in industrial countries.  These effects are quite strong in the candidate countries 
for the EU accession and they contribute to the persistence of inflation (Szapáry, 2000).  
Consequently, they tend to disconnect a link between the inflation process and changes in 
monetary variables. 
As shown in Table 3, both backward and forward looking expectations do affect 
current inflation rates, however, at various degrees.  While in Hungary backward-looking 
expectations and indexation play a strong role, a sensitivity of inflation to its forecast is 
statistically insignificant.  This confirms the statement that the inflationary process in this 
country has not been strongly sensitive to future expectations, which is perhaps consistent 
with the pegged exchange rate regime.  The new framework for the NBH monetary 
policy is likely to change this situation since it emphasizes the importance of inflation 
forecast and other forward looking variables for policy decisions.  Current inflation is 
certainly sensitive to its most recent trend in all three countries.  It is highly sensitive to 
the first order autoregressive process, thus it is certainly supported by strong, backward-
looking indexation.  Although the future inflation forecast is less significant, it is an 
important explanatory factor of inflation, primarily in Poland.  As argued before, this 
stems directly from systemic foundations that decide how forward-looking expectations 
are transmitted into the inflation process.  Polish firms and markets may be sensitive to   19
the expected inflation trend since the NBP widely applies a policy bias in monetary 
policy communication.  It can be expected that inflation forecasts and rational 
expectations will play a more significant role in the future, as monetary policies become 
more transparent and, generally speaking, more credible. 
The relationship between seasonally adjusted industrial production and the 
inflation process seems to be quite apparent, as also confirmed for Hungary by Siklos and 
Abel (2001).  This suggests that a Phillips-curve-type relationship may be evident in 
these economies, at least in the short-run.  Monetary easing (or tightening) seems to 
correspond with an increase (or slowdown) in industrial activity.  For instance, in the 
Czech Republic, a significant and prolonged monetary tightening, particularly during the 
period between the third quarter of 1997 and the first quarter of 1999, had a strong, 
negative impact on the country’s industrial output.  A similar slowdown in output growth 
is observed in Poland in 2000 and 2001, in part because of the extremely tight monetary 
policy (which is evidenced by the high inflation risk premiums shown in Table 1).   
Interestingly, the data seem to indicate that the Phillips curve process is somewhat more 
pronounced under conditions of more flexible exchange rates in Poland and in the Czech 
Republic, than in Hungary. 
Intriguing results are provided by the  3 β  estimates.  These coefficients show to 
what extent the expected trend in foreign (German) inflation is transmitted via variation 
in the current exchange rate onto domestic inflation.  Evidently, the reactions of current 
inflation to the expected German inflation and to the exchange rate trend are quite 
different in these economies.  The coefficient is statistically significant and has a positive 
sign for Hungary, meaning that increases in the EU, or more precisely, in German 
inflation expectations are transmitted to domestic inflation, particularly under the fixed 
exchange rate regime.  In contrast, the coefficient is statistically significant; yet, it has a 
negative sign in the case of the Czech net inflation.  This suggests frequent pre-emptive 
policy responses of the CNB to the expected external inflationary pressures.  
It is rather perplexing that the real exchange rate movement in the preceding 
period has little impact on the inflationary process in all three countries.  This suggests 
weaker pass-through effects of exchange rates into inflation than that claimed by both 
policy-makers and independent researchers (Szapáry and Jakab, 1998; Golinelli and 
Rovelli, 2001).   
Short-term interest rate differentials do not appear to be seemingly related to the 
inflation process, with the exception of the Czech CPI inflation (as confirmed also by 
Matoušek, 2001).  Their impact on inflation in Poland and in Hungary might be overrated 
in the official policy statements and central bank reports.  Both countries are fairly well 
cushioned from large external speculative attacks, as proven by relative stability of their 
financial markets in the aftermath of the Asian and the Russian financial crises (Gelos 
and Sahay, 2000).  But the weak connection between short-term market interest rates, 
suggests that calls for monetary policies that are based on interest rate targeting might be 
unsubstantiated; such policies are not likely to be effective in lowering inflation. 
By comparison, differentials in bank lending rates in the preceding period do 
matter in the tested model.  This is clearly the case in Hungary and, to a lesser degree, in 
Poland.  They have also a somewhat pronounced impact on the Czech net inflation.    The 
obtained results indicate that if domestic lending rates in the previous period are higher 
than the German lending rates, borrowers are likely to bring large amounts of credit from   20
German and other EU banks.  Large inflows of foreign bank credit are likely to add to the 
ongoing inflation process in the examined transition economies.  This factor deserves 
strong attention of central banks in these countries in their decisions about interest rate 
target levels.  
The presented tests indicate that inflation in all three countries is strongly 
influenced by the autoregressive process.  Current inflation is affected by the most 
recently observed trend and it might be also influenced by its dynamic trajectory, or the 
overall trend. 
In order to detect a precise pattern of inflation, the estimates of which would be 
robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, a simplified inflation function can be 
estimated with a generalized method of moments (GMM).  The specified estimated 
equation can be designed as a vector autoregressive function that includes the stochastic 
time trend: 
 
TREND t t t c c c c π π π π 4 2 3 1 2 1 ˆ + + + = − −                            (16) 
 
The GMM methodology allows for choosing a list of instrument variables the changes of 
which do not become autocorrelated with the residuals in the estimated inflation function 
(16).  Therefore, in order to alleviate the problem of autocorrelation between these 
residuals and the changes in the key instrument variables of monetary policy, I have 
conducted the GMM estimation of (16) while selecting the nominal exchange rate, the 
short-term interest rate differential (with Germany) and the constant term as GMM 
instrument variables.  In other words, the choice of exchange rates and interest rates as 
instrument variables allows for insulating inflation as the monetary policy goal from 
autocorrelation with the policy instruments.  As before, the inflation trend is based on the 
Hodrick Prescott filter estimation.  
The GMM results are shown in Table 4.  The empirical estimation shows no 
significant revelations comparing to the previously obtained results.  As proven before, 
the strongest accelerator (or decelerator) of inflation is its most recently observed 
tendency, or, in technical terms, the first order autoregressive process.  The second order 
process has a somewhat reversed, corrective impact in current inflation, and the overall 
dynamic trend seems to play a less significant role.  The different results between a 
forward looking (6 months ahead) trend in Table 3 and the GMM estimated dynamic 
trend in Table 4 seem to indicate autocorrelation between the trend inflation, and interest 
rate differentials and exchange rates. 
 
 
Table 4: GMM Estimation of the Inflationary Process (16) 
 












































































2  0.983 0.789  0.967  0.976 0.989 
Durbin 
Watson 
2.250 2.259  2.615  1.598 2.540 
J-statistics 0.0076  0.0035 0.0026 0.0022  0.0113 
 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in upper and t-statistics in lower parentheses. The 
GMM estimates are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation due to the selection 
of the time series (HAC) weighting matrix option.  The estimation is based on the 
selection of the fixed (3) bandwidth, Bartlett kernel, with no prewhitening.  The J-
statistics reflect the minimized value of the objective function. 
 
Source: Own calculations based on data as in Table 2. 
 
The fairly robust statistical results of the autoregressive process with the trend for 
Poland and the Czech Republic are not confirmed for Hungary.  However, a de-trended 
function reaffirms a strong role of the autoregressive process, which is taking place there 
as well.  Thereby, the Hungarian inflation appears to be less connected with its dynamic 
path, which may be at least partially related to the NBH’s highly discretionary monetary 
policy based on exchange rate targeting that prevailed in the investigated period of time 
between January 1995 and June 2001.  As proven by Golinelli and Rovelli (2001), the 
stubbornly high Hungarian inflation is susceptible to systemic factors, such as the rate of 
crawling devaluation and the fiscal policy stance. 
In general terms, the presented empirical analysis shows that inflation in the EU 
candidate countries does not very strongly depend on changes in financial variables, at 
least in the short-run.  However, with the advancement of their inflation targeting 
regimes, such variables are likely to be increasingly inter-related with the inflation 
process. 
 
V. Concluding  Remarks 
 
Optimal sequencing of changes in monetary policies among the candidate countries that 
is aimed at facilitating the process of the EU/EMU accession is a perennial topic of 
concern and discussion.  In seeking to refine the presented theoretical framework and 
empirical analysis, I conclude that monetary convergence process is best served with 
policies based on flexible inflation targeting and it should end, perhaps a bit abruptly, 
with a leap to euroization.  Policies to this end are entirely possible and can help reinforce 
commitment to disinflation and ensure achieving the goal of price stability over time.    22
They are likely to eradicate systemic problems with lowering inflation, including nominal 
indexation of wages and prices that still plays a strong role in these economies.  As the 
above empirical evidence suggests, inflation in Central European transition economies is 
strongly influenced by the autoregressive process, or predominantly by backward-looking 
expectations that directly affect the scope of nominal indexation. It is also hardly a 
surprise that central banks in transition economies are concerned with defying fiscal 
dominance that at the present time seems to be threatening a further pursuit of 
disinflation. 
  In response to these problems, flexible inflation targeting seems to offer a viable 
policy framework that preserves autonomy of central banks and their full commitment to 
price stability.  It is also likely to strengthen connection between inflation and key 
monetary policy variables, namely interest rates and exchange rate, thus to diminish the 
interference of exogenous factors such as fiscal dominance, political risk, administrative 
price adjustments, etc. 
  The factors disconnecting inflation from the monetary variables can have either a 
transitory or a more dynamic impact.  Changes in administratively regulated prices or 
VAT adjustments are likely to have a transitory influence on inflation.  They do not have 
to be considered by central banks in setting monetary policy goals and determining its 
tactics.  A more permanent impact on the perseverance of inflation is linked to structural 
changes in the economy that cause changes in relative prices and add to inflation through 
the Balassa-Samuelson process.  These factors cannot be directly influenced by central 
banks and they have to be incorporated into the policy goals and targets.  If short-term, 
operating targets are too ambitious and ignore these factors, monetary policy may 
become too tight; it will lead inadvertently to large instability of output and exchange 
rates.  For this reason, a framework of flexible inflation targeting that takes stable 
exchange rate into consideration is certainly more appropriate for the economies in 
transition.   
Since the catching up and the BSE phenomena are likely to continue in the 
foreseeable future, it would be imprudent for transition countries to rush to the eurozone 
prematurely.  They need to establish foundations of price stability and gain a sustainable 
degree of monetary credibility by ‘internal means’ or with autonomous monetary policies 
instead.  Moreover, because of the persistence of structural and BSE factors in the EU 
candidate countries, the formal criteria of their accession to the EU and later to the EMU 
need to deviate from the rigor of the Maastricht Treaty.  If the accession is to be 
completed within the next several years, the inflation convergence might be redesigned to 
accommodate these dynamic processes, for instance, set at a maximum of 1.5 percent 
above the overall HICP inflation in the eurozone, rather than above that of the three 
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